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ARGUMENT
In responding to Guardian Title Company of Utah's (Guardian) appeal, Tebbs &
Smith, P.C. (Tebbs), has essentially made three arguments in support of the trial court's
decision: (1) Guardian's Complaint alleges only tort claims and not contract claims; (2)
Tebbs was entitled to summary judgment because Guardian allegedly caused some of its own
damages; and (3) all of Guardian's claims are barred because Tebbs' employee, Stacey
Mitchell, was acting outside of the scope of her employment. Each of these arguments will
be addressed in turn.
I.

GUARDIAN ALLEGED CONTRACT CLAIMS

Tebbs does not dispute that there was a contract between Tebbs and Guardian nor
does it apparently dispute that a cause of action for breach of contract for professional
services exists in Utah. Rather, it asserts that Guardian has not alleged a contract cause of
action. It proffers two reasons to support its premise. First it contends there can be no cause
of action in contract because there was no explicit "provision that a Tebbs' employee would
not write checks to herself or that Tebbs would indemnify Guardian for the criminal acts of
an employee." (Brief of Appellee 6.) Secondly, it asserts that Guardian's claims that Tebbs
breached implied covenants are in actuality disguised tort claims.
It is true that there is no record evidence that Tebbs and Guardian expressly agreed
that Tebbs' employees would not write checks to themselves. However, as discussed at
length in the Appellant's Brief, Guardian has alleged that Tebbs entered into a verbal
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agreement with Guardian to provide and perform professional public accounting services,
including preparation of checks made payable to Guardian's employees and drawn on
Guardian's bank checking account (Payroll Account) and the performance of account
statement reconciliation services with regard to the Payroll Account. These facts are
undisputed and admitted. (See R. at 3, 37, 182-83, 210.) A necessary implication of these
contractual terms is that Tebbs was to provide those services for which the parties contracted.
Thus, when Tebbs agreed that it would prepare checks made payable to Guardian's
employees, the agreement contemplated that Tebbs would perform those services and write
such checks exclusively to Guardian employees and not to any other person. In writing
checks to a Tebbs employee, Tebbs has breached the express terms of the contract.
Even had Tebbs' actions not violated an express term of the contract, they certainly
violated implied terms. In its brief, Tebbs argues, as it did below, that any claim for breach
of an implied or constructive covenant, particularly the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, is a claim for a breach of a duty imposed by law. (See Brief of Appellee 8.) The
primary problem with this argument is that the argument misstates the law clearly established
by this Court.
The case law on this point is very clear. If a wrongdoer's obligation "to refrain from"
doing a particular act "depend[s] upon any express or implied promise arising from the ..
. contract," a breach of that obligation gives rise to a cause of action in contract. Peterson
v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). If, however, the
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wrongdoer's obligation to refrain from doing a particular act arises from "'a legal duty
independently imposed as a result of what the [wrongdoer] undertook to do with relation to
the plaintiffs interest,'" a breach of that obligation gives rise to a cause of action in tort.
DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 437 (Utah 1983) (quoting Carl S. Hawkins,
Retaining Traditional Tort Liability in the Nonmedical Professions, 1981 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 33,
36). Accordingly, if the breach is of an implied promise arising from the contract, it is a
breach of a contractual duty.
Additionally, this Court has unambiguously held that a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing "'is read into contracts in order to protect the express covenants or
promises of the contract, not to protect some general public policy interest not directly tied
to the contract's purpose.'" Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1992)
(quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 394 (Cal. 1988)); see also Beck v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985). Hence, this Court has expressly
concluded that "a violation of th[e] duty [of good faith and fair dealing] gives rise to a claim
for breach of contract" Beck, 701 P.2d at 798 (emphasis added); see also St. Benedict's
Dev. Co v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991).1
1

Tebbs claims that Guardian did not properly plead a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. (See Brief of Appellee 14.) Of course, the only requirements of a
complaint are that it contain a "short plain statement... showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief and "a demand for judgment for the relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). In fact,
a complaint is required only to " . . . give the opposing party fair notice of the
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type
of litigation involved." It may also frequently be found stated in these cases
122998.GU006.010
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Despite these clear holdings, with nothing more than highly selective quotations from
two cases, Tebbs conjures a new legal theory from its cauldron of equivocation. Citing the
"growing out o f language of DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983),
and the inapposite holding regarding the public policy exception to the employment at-will
doctrine in the Peterson case, (see Brief of Appellee 8-9), Tebbs proposes a new and
unsupportable theory: if a court has, as a matter of law, recognized an implied duty in a
contract, a breach of that duty necessarily gives rise to a claim in tort. As explained fully in
the Appellant's Brief and briefly above, the rule in Utah is expressly contrary to any such
theory.
Finally, without any analysis, Tebbs reiterates its argument that Guardian's Complaint
actually is a disguised tort claim. (See Brief of Appellee 11.) However, this argument
demonstrates Tebbs misunderstanding of the Complaint and the facts. Guardian has alleged
that (1) when Tebbs failed to pay only Guardian's employees, it failed to fulfill the terms of
its contract with Guardian, and (2) when Tebbs failed to disclose that it had written and paid
that a complaint does not fail to state a claim unless " . . . it appears to a
certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts
which could be proved in support of the claim."
Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157,280 P.2d 453,455 (1955). Even a cursory review of
the Complaint makes clear that Guardian has alleged the facts necessary to raise the claim.
Specifically, the Complaint states that Tebbs "expressly and implicitly covenanted and
agreed that it would charge and commission the performance of. . . services and duties by
such of its employees as would perform the same accurately, properly, competently and with
honesty and fidelity." (R. at 3, ^f 11.) This reference to an implied covenant to perform
"properly" and "with honesty and fidelity" is certainly sufficient to plead a claim for breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
122998.GU006.010
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unauthorized checks, it failed to fulfill the terms of its contract with Guardian. Guardian
does not allege that Tebbs' level of practice fell below a standard of care because it gave
Guardian bad accounting advise or it failed to supervise its employees or it failed to follow
certain accounting standards. Guardian alleges only that it had a contract with Tebbs to
perform certain acts, and Tebbs did not perform those acts or did not perform those acts in
good faith. See, e.g., Clark v. Milam, 847 F. Supp. 409, 420-21 (S.D. W. Va. 1994). Such
a claim is a breach of contract claim. See Dan L. Goldwasser & M. Thomas Arnold,
Accountants' Liability § 3.2, at 3-11, 3-13 (1996) ("Accountants may be held liable for
breach of contract where they fail to perform a specific service which they are committed by
contract to perform;" and "an accountant may be held liable for failing to perform contractual
obligations in a satisfactory manner."); cf. Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal
Malpractice § 8.8 (1996) ("The client may instruct the attorney to perform certain tasks or
to act in a specified manner. The undertaking then becomes contractual in nature, and the
failure to perform can result in virtual strict liability for any resulting injury.")
II.

T H E QUESTION OF CAUSATION IS A DISPUTED ISSUE OF FACT

Tebbs next argues that "the trial court concluded, as a matter of law,... that Guardian
could not establish the requisite causation." (Brief of Appellee 6.) In support of this theory,
Tebbs, citing Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins, 2000 UT 21,996 P.2d 531, and Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-38, argues that to determine whether Guardian can prove the requisite "thread
of causation" requiring recovery from Tebbs, "the Court should take into consideration
122998 GU006 010
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Guardian's own role in causing the loss." (Brief of Appellee 10-12.) Each of the citations
relied upon by Tebbs refers to apportionment of fault in a comparative negligence case.
Obviously then, although the argument Tebbs has made is couched as a "causation"
argument, it is really a mitigation/comparative negligence argument.
The most obvious flaw in this argument is that, even if the trial court had concluded
that Tebbs was entitled to summary judgment based upon its causation argument, such a
conclusion would be incorrect as a matter of law.2 What Tebbs fails to recognize is that
whether the plaintiff failed to mitigate is a factual issue which Tebbs bears "the burden of
proving." John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). Viewing all evidence in a light most favorable to Guardian, there is at least a factual
issue as to whether Guardian was required to mitigate, and, if so, how much the damages
should be reduced. Further, Tebbs cites no authority that given the facts at issue, Tebbs
would entitle it to summary judgment.
The facts are simple. Guardian hired Tebbs to do its payroll accounting work,
including reconciliation and preparing and filing the taxes. {See R. at 388.) Guardian paid
Tebbs to do this work.

Tebbs had all of Guardian's relevant bank statements, cash

disbursement, and bank draft journals. {See id. at 385, 392-93.) Because of the contract,
Tebbs had the best and only realistic opportunity to discover its breach. However, even
2

Another problem with the argument is that the trial court never explicitly ruled that
it was granting summary judgment on the basis of the causation argument. {See R. at 464,
33-34.)
122998 GU006 010

&

Tebbs did not discover Mitchell's activity. (See id. at 386.) If Tebbs, who had all of the
records and relevant documents in its possession and who supervised Mitchell's work, did
not discover the activity, it strains common sense to urge that Guardian should have, as a
matter of law, discovered it sooner.
Tebbs has also implicitly argued that Guardian's claim is barred by the doctrine of
comparative negligence. Comparative negligence applies only to a negligence claim. See,
e.g., Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins, 2000 UT 21, f4, 996 P.2d 531. In this case,
Guardian has not urged a negligence claim but a breach of contract claim. Even if this were
a negligence cause of action, however, the question of whether an entity is comparatively
negligent is also a question of fact for which Tebbs would bear the burden of proof. See
Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah 1979). As discussed above, the trial court did not,
and, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Guardian, could not grant summary
judgment on the evidence in this case. Genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the
actions of Guardian. Again, summary judgment was inappropriately granted.3

3

Tebbs has cited law relating to a bank customer's duty to examine statements and
checks for forgery in support of its position that the court can examine the reasonableness
of a party's action in preventing fraud. {See Brief of Appellee 18-19.) There are several
problems with this argument.
First, none of the law cited by Tebbs states that the mere presentation alone of
evidence of some negligence by a party who was the victim of a fraudulent act entitles the
party presenting the evidence to summary judgment. As described above, there is a
substantial factual dispute as to whether Guardian's conduct contributed to its damages, and,
even if it did, how much of its conduct could be attributed to its damages.
Second, these authorities are factually inapposite to this case. The law cited by Tebbs
relates to a person's obligation to discover a bank's payment to a third-party who had
122998 GU006 010
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III.

T H E TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE TORT DOCTRINE THAT
AN EMPLOYER IS NOT LIABLE IN RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR FOR THE ILLEGAL A C T OF
AN EMPLOYEE IS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE TO A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION
AGAINST THE EMPLOYER

Finally, Tebbs argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because, although it
agrees "that principals are bound by the acts of their agents," "illegal acts by an employee,
for the sole benefit and purpose of the employee and not the employer,... are not within the
actual or apparent scope of authority." (Brief of Appellee 20.) Accordingly, Tebbs argues,
it could not "be liable for such illegal acts." (Id.)
The trial court's conclusion and Tebbs arguments are based upon an incorrect
understanding of the law and Guardian's arguments. Guardian's sole contention is that
Tebbs breached the terms of its contract with Guardian when it failed to pay only Guardian
employees and when it failed to reconcile bank statements. Thus, the question before the
trial court was fairly straightforward: Did Tebbs breach its contract by failing to pay only
Guardian employees and failing to reconcile bank statements? As discussed fully in the
Appellant's Brief, the resolution of that question does not depend on the reason for the

negotiated a check with an unauthorized signature or had negotiated an altered check. If the
bank's employee had improperly debited a customer's account or the bank paid money in
violation of its contract with the depositor, it would have liability.
A bank is under the duty to disburse funds in accordance with the directions
of its depositor. It is implicit in the Uniform Commercial Code that a bank
may not charge its customer for any item not properly payable against the
customer's account.
10 Am. Jur.2d, Banks & Financial Institutions § 890 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
122998 GU006 010
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breach, only that a breach occurred. Further, the tort doctrine of respondeat superior does
not apply in a contract claim.
CONCLUSION
Tebbs' position, reduced to its essential core, is that although Tebbs hired an
employee that wrongfully converted money from its client, Tebbs has no liability for that
conduct even though it thereby breached its contract with the client. Such a result is
obviously contrary to the law and common sense.
The trial court incorrectly concluded that Utah law requires that any action brought
against a professional accounting firm must be treated in all respects as a negligence cause
of action. The trial court also incorrectly concluded that an action for the breach of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is one sounding in tort. Moreover, the trial
court incorrectly concluded that Guardian attempted to use the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing to add new, independent terms to the contract. Finally, the trial court incorrectly
concluded that Tebbs was not liable in breach of contract for breaches of contract caused by
an illegal act committed by an employee.

122998 GU006 010

9

Accordingly, Guardian respectfully requests this Court to reverse the order granting
summary judgment to Tebbs and remand the case for trial.
DATED this

1"T day of September, 2001.
& SENIOR

Jary A. Weston
I). Scott Crook
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Guardian Title Company
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Douglas T. Hall, Esq.
4885 South 900 East, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117-5793
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Tebbs & Smith
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